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Reserve System.Large budget deficits have been a major source of controversy
in recent years. Federal budget deficits have cumulated to nearly $250
billion in the past eight years, and this year's will add another $50
billion or so. Justifications for most of these deficits have focused
on general weakness in the economy, while critics have warned of acceler-
ating inflation and crowding out. Yet the economic stimulus has been
less than hoped and the effect on capital markets less than feared. One
source of misunderstanding may be a failure to consider the effect of
inflation on the significance of the size of the deficit.
Persistent inflation over the past decade has already forced a
reexamination of many economic statistics. Discussion of· current economic
activity now centers on real GNP rather than nominal GNP as was common a
decade ago. The leading indicators on the Commerce Department's index
are now in real terms, also. The price-deflated data have generally
proved more useful for evaluating and predicting the condition of the
economy. The desirability of some less straightforward inflation adjust-
ments to remove distortions in business balance sheets and income statements
has also become widely accepted. The Commerce Department's national income
and product accounts (NIPA) now use replacement costs rather than historical
costs in the measurement of capital consumption, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission now requires similar estimates at the firm level. Still
other accounting adjustments would produce more useful measures of economic2
activity in an inflationary period.l In particular, adjustment to
the Federal budget surplus or deficit would make it a more useful
summary measure of the impact of the Federal Government on the economy.
An adjusted Federal budget deficit which takes account of the
effects of inflation on the real value of the Federal debt would provide
a better indication of the Government's fiscal position. Under current
budget procedures inflation can cause increases in measured deficits with-
out increasing the impact of the Federal Government on capital markets.
After an appropriate adjustment, which would correct this distortion,
surpluses and deficits would be roughly equal over the past decade. The
same inflation adjustment could also be applied to the fUll-employment
budget. providing an improved measure of fiscal policy. The current full-
employment budget measure Overestimates the expansiveness of Government
policy during periods of inflation relative to periods of price stability.
The Adjustment
The budget surplus or deficit is basically a measure of whether
spending by the Government is less or more than its income. Since 1950
the Government has piled up deficits exceeding surpluses by $279 billion
in the national income and product accounts. The net national debt (which
does not include what the Government owes itself) has increased by an
even greater $344 billion Over the same period. primarily to finance those
deficits. However. when the debt figures are adjusted for inflation. they
show no significant change over the 27-year period.2
The cause of this paradox is a failure to examine real rather
than nominal magnitudes. In real terms, inflation produces a capital gain3
on its debt for the Government, as it does for all net debtors. Inflation
diminishes the real liability of the Government because inflated dollars
are easier to repay and the fixed interest payments are less burdensome.
In nominal terms, however, there is no gain since the amount to be repaid
e~uals the amount borrowed.3
The effect on private lenders is, of course, just the reverse.
In order to protect themselves they will require the Government to pay
higher interest rates on its debt, just offsetting the decrease in the
real value of their bondholdings. The increased interest payments, or
inflation premiums,can be considered equivalent to an early return of a
portion of the principal.
The expectation of inflation does not change the real return
demanded by investors; it merely changes the form and timing of the real
return. Investors receive higher interest payments during the life of
their loan, but the lump-sum repayment of principal at maturity has a
smaller real value. A budget problem occurs because we count the inflation
premiums paid by the Government as an expense in the budget but do not
count, as income, the offsetting diminution in the real value of the debt.
Since expectations are imperfect, the inflation premiums will often
either overcompensate or undercompensate investors. To the extent that
inflation is underestimated, investors suffer a decline in the real value
of their bondholdings greater than the inflation premiums they receive.
Conversely, when inflation is overestimated, the premiums exceed the
capital loss in real terms. The effect of the error in expectations is to
produce a windfall gain or loss in addition to the fully anticipated gain
that compensates for the inflation premiums. Although overestimates and4
underestimates should balance Qut over time, errors in expectations can
cause significant real income losses or gains in any given year.
An obvious solution, encompassing both anticipated inflation
and the errors in anticipations, would be to add the Government's accrued
4
real capital gain to the rest of its accrued income in the NIPA budget.
This could be done by multiplying the average Government debt outstanding
in any year by the rate of price inflation for that year and adding the
product to the existing measure of the Federal surplus (or subtracting
it from the deficit.)5 The magnitude of some of the adjustments would be
considerable as can be seen in Table T. The December-to-December change
in the cpr was chosen as the measure of inflation because the CPI appears
monthly and may therefore provide the best approximation to price change
from December 31 to December 31. However, since many items in the CPI
are not priced every month, the choice is debatable. The computed adjustment
is particularly large for 1974, when rapid inflation and a growing debt
produced a $42.2 billion capital gain in real terms for the Government.
Taking account of the effects of inflation on the debt for that year would
be enough to turn the deficit of $10.7 billion into a surplus of $31.5
billion.
Over the postwar period, the adjustment would increase Government
income in each year except 1949 and 1954, when prices declined. It would
turn deficits into surpluses in eight years since 1957 so that, in the
adjusted figures, surpluses would predominate. This is consistent with
our earlier observationthat the price-deflated Federal debt has not increased
significantly during the period.
The effect of the adjustment in the past decade, when inflation
rates were high, is startling. The cumulative deficit for the years 1968Table I.
5
·Unadjusted and Inflation-Adjusted Federal Deficit5

























































































































































































































1975 394.4 7.0 27.6
1976 471.9 4.8 22.7
1971 535.2 6.8 36.4









L, Average of beginning and end of year data.
2. December-to-December change in consumer price index.
e-- Estimated by author.
SOURCE: Economic Report of the Pr-esdderrt, 1976 and 1978.
Column (6) = (4) + (5).
Column (4) = (2) x (3).
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SOURCE: Table I, Column (71T
to 1977 is over $240 billion but would amount to only $15 billion after
adjustment. For the past three years alone, inflation adjustment reduces
the combined $174 billion deficit by almost 50 percent.
The Effect of the Budget on Capital Markets
The inflation-adjusted figures provide a truer picture of the
extent to which the Federal Government has been augmenting or absorbing
gross national saving in recent years. This has an important bearing on
the often-expressed concern that huge budget deficits have been crowding
out private investment.
Consider the outlook for 1978. For the calendar year, a reason-
able estimate of the budget deficit (NIPA basis) is about $50 billion.
The Federal Government will have to increase its nominal debt by a similar
amount, which will tend to push interest rates above what they would be if
the budget were in balance. Some marginal investment projects will be
rejected because of the higher interest rates. Concern has also been
expressed that large deficits are inflationary since the Fed tends to
counteract pressures on interest rates by stepping up its purchases of
Government securities. Thus, the Fed may finance part of the deficit by
increasing the money supply more than might otherwise be desirable.
The advantage of adjusting the deficit for inflation is that it
helps put these concerns in perspective. The Government's real debt will
not increase as much as its nominal debt. Prices may be expected to increase
about 7 percent during 1978. With private holdings of Federal debt expected
to average about $595 billion, holders can anticipate real capital losses
caused by inflation of roughly $42 billion. To compensate for this. current8
market interest rates include SUbstantial inflation premiums. But
there is no reason to suppose that these premiums will be treated as
spendable income by recipients. These payments must be reinvested if
the real value of the bondholders' wealth is to be maintained.
Inflation has increased the deficit by significantly raising
the nominal interest costs of the Federal Government. But insofar as
inflation predictions are accurate, the additional interest payments are
essentially returns of principal, which will be reinvested if the real
demand for Government debt is unchanged. Thus, $42 billion of the $50
billion deficit can be returned to capital markets without the incentive
of higher real interest rates. The Government's net drain on savings
will be only about $8 billion for the year.6
If inflation turns out to be less than feared, investors will
suffer smaller losses in the real value of their debt holdings than antici-
pated, and some portion of the large inflation premiums will become wind-
fall gains for investors. Windfall gains would not generally be reinvested
in Government debt unless the wealth elasticity of Government securities
is quite high. Therefore, the Government's net drain on savings would
exceed $8 billion. Greater than expected inflation would have the opposite
effect. The adjusted deficit figure is computed with the actual inflation
rate, and so would include any windfalls. Regardless of the accuracy of
expectations, the adjusted figure gives a much better picture of the pros-
pective net impact of Government on capital markets and national saving
than the $54 billion nominal deficit.
The adjusted deficit also provides a better perspective on the
possible effects of the budget on monetary policy. Because the inflation9
premiums can be expected to be reinvested without affecting interest rates,
five-sixths of the deficit is more or less self-financing. The Fed should
not feel pressured to finance any more of the 1978 deficit than it would
finance of a $8 billion deficit if there were no inflation.!
Measurement of Fiscal Policy
The budget surplus or deficit is a major instrument of national
economic policy. It is widely agreed that the greater the budget deficit,
the more stimulative is its effect on the economy. However, as a measure
of fiscal policy, the reported Federal surplus or deficit has been criticized
on a number of grounds. The most prominent and widely accepted criticism
is that deficits are endogenously determined. Automatic stabilizers such
as income taxes and unemployment compensation depend in the short run
on the strength of the economy. The resulting deficits or surpluses
primarily reflect this rather than overt policy decisions.
The full-employment surplus (FES), which estimates what the
budget surplus would be at full employment, was developed to focus attention
on purely discretionary fiscal policy. It removes the influence of
automatic stabilizers by evaluating the budget at a specified level of
resource utilization meant to be comparable over time. While its weaknesses
are well known, the FES has become a convenient reference point for public
discussion of budgets.8 Budgets can be characterized as more or less
restrictive as the FEB is higher or lower. Those who think that the
automatic stabilizers have just the right amount of responsiveness to
changes in resource utilization can argue for an unchanging FEB at some
predetermined level. Those who think that automatic stabilizers are in-
adequate for countering business fluctuations can argue for a counter-
cyclical FES policy.10
However, the FES is improved by the same inflation adjustment
as the NIPA deficit. Inflation depreciates the value of privately held
Government debt. This represents a transfer, in real terms, of financial
assets from the pUblic to the Government. Like taxes, such a transfer
reduces real income available for private spending. If inflation expecta-
tions are accurate, investors will require inflation premiums just equal
to the loss of asset value caused by inflation.9 In this case, inflation
does not affect investors' net income. With no effect on real net income
available for private spending, no economic stimulus is provided. But
since current procedure is to include the higher interest costs in the
Government's budget and not the change in the real value of the debt~
inflation causes an increase in the deficit that has no stimulative effect.
Thus, an FES deficit in an inflationary period is not necessarily more
expansive than a surplus in a noninflationary period. It is obviously
undesirable that a policy measure should be so ambiguous.
When inflation expectations are not accurate~ the analysis
is only slightly changed. To the extent that inflation is underestimated,
investors' losses of capital value are not matched by inflation premiums
received. Conversely, when it is overestimated, the premiums exceed the
real capital loss. The effect of the error in expectations is to produce
windfall losses or gains for investors. The change in real capital value
is still very important to debtholders, but their perception of it is
different. The windfall loss or gain is a one-time transfer to or from
the Government, like a temporary tax surcharge or a tax rebate. Such losses
or gains can have a significant short-run impact on the economy by reducing
or augmenting, on a temporary basis, the funds available for private11
spending. Like rebates and surcharges, it seems reasonable to include
them in the inflation-adjusted fiscal policy measure. However, windfall
gains to investors cannot be expected to be as stimulative as an equal
sized permanent tax cut would be.
The inflation-adjusted FEB is a better indicator for consideration
of both short-run changes in policy and the long-term trend of policy. In
the short run, it gives a more accurate assessment of the direction of
fiscal policy. We normally say that a change to a lower FEB indicates a
shift to a more expansionary policy. But if the rate of inflation increases
at the same time, we may be fooling ourselves. An increase in inflation
means an increase in real capital losses for holders of Government bonds.
This would tend to cancel the effect of the drop in the FES.
The inflation-adjusted FES is also a better focal point for
discussions of the longer run. For example, the administration's earlier-
stated goal of a conventionally balanced budget and full employment by
1981 was too vague. The impact of such a budget on the economy would
depend on whatever the inflation rate happened to be at that time. As
currently measured, a balanced budget at full employment when prices are
stable will have the same economic impact as a deficit when there is some
price inflation. Since inflation is widely expected to persist for many
years, long-run targets in terms of an unadjusted FES may be unintentionally
restrictive.
For those who believe a balanced full-employment budget is an
appropriate norm, the difference between the adjusted and unadjusted
numbers in recent years may be bothersome. Table II shows that while
the most recent estimates of the Council of Economic Advisers indicate
deficits in all but two years since 1969, the inflation-adjusted full12
Table II. Unadjusted and In.fJ.~tion-Ad.justed
Fu.1l Employment Federal Def'icits _
(Doll~ amounts. in billions)
Adjustment Full
Average for change employment Adjusted
net Rate in reaJ. suzp'lua or FEB Deficit
Calendar Federal of value of deficit (-) as a Percent
year debt inf'lation1J Federal (NIPA basis) 6f GNP
debt Unadjusted Adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1969 $280.3 6.1% $17.1 $ 3.7 $20.8 2.2%
1970 285.7 5.5 15.7 -2.7 13.0 1.3
1971 305.1 3.4 . 10.4 -9.9 .5 .0
1972 325.3 3.4 11.1 -11.8 -.7 -.1
1973 336.4 8.8 29.6 -8.3 21.3 1.6
1974 345.9 12.2 42.2 7.8 50.0 3.5
1975 394.4 7.0 27.6 -24.2 3.4 .2
1976 4n.9 4.8 22.7 -17.3 5.4 .3
1977 535.2 6.8 36.4 -17.9 18.5 1.0
1978e ... 595.0 7.0 41.6 -17.0 24.6 1.2
1. December-to-December change in consumer price index.
e-Es.timated by author.
SOURCE: Economic Report of the President 1918.13
TABLE II. FULL EMPLO,'I'MENT SURPLUS AS A'
PERCENT OF POTENTIAL GNP
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employment budget was in surplus in every year but one. Fiscal policy
appears considerably tighter thantheCEA's unadjusted figures indicate.
The full-employment levels chosen by the Council are. however, somewhat
arbitrary. If, as may well be the case, target employment levels
should be lower, these surpluses do not indicate undesirably restrictive
policy.
The relative levels of the FEB and the year-to-year changes
are virtually unaffected by the definition of full employment. Looking
at the year-to-year changes, the adjustments show that the official figures
significantly underestimate the swing to restraint in both 1973 and 1974.
This error may have led policymakers to a more restrictive policy than they
intended. contributing to the severity of the 1974-75 recession. The
adjusted figures also show a stronger swing to restraint in 1971 than the
conventional estimates.
Summary and Conclusion
Inflationffrtftsprice_adjusted financial wealth from the public
to the Government in a way that current budget procedure does not take
into account. It does this by reducing the real value of the large outstand-
ing Federal debt. Debtholders are compensated for their lost resources
with higher interest rates. and. in general. the inflation premiums and
real capital loss offset each other. The budget. however, includes only
the interest payments and not the change in real capital value. Thus,
the budget deficit is overstated in inflationary periods.
This can easily be adjusted for by adding to Government income
in the budget the decrease in real value of the national debt that is15
caused by inflation. The resulting figures provide a better perspective
on the contribution of the Federal Government to national saving and on
the relative expansiveness of fiscal policy. For example, with prices
expected to increase I percent in 1978, roughly $42 billion of the
probable $50 billion deficit for calendar 1978 will likely be returned
to capital markets without affecting interest rates. Net Government
dissaving in real terms, will be only about $8 billion rather than $50
billion. Thus, a large deficit is much easier to finance during an
inflationary period. And since $42 billion of the deficit does not enter
the real net income streams of its recipients, 1978 fiscal policy will
be no more stimulative than an $8 billion deficit would be if prices
were stable.
Rapid inflation has had similar effects throughout the past
decade. Over that period, properly adjusted surpluses and deficits
totaled roughly the same, so that the Government has not actually been
a long-term absorber of private savings. Reappraisal of fiscal policy
also shows that it was much more restrictive in 1973 and 1914 than
conventional figures indicate.16
Appendix
Is the full-employment surplus the best measure of policy to
adjust? Various improvements in the full-employment surplus (FES) have
been recommended. Several are of limited value in general forums since
they depend crucially on some particular econometric model of the economy_
Attempts to give different weight to changes in income taxes compared
with changes in Government purchases of goods and services fall into this
category. Others seek to broaden the category of nondiscretionary changes
to be excluded from the policy measure. Both normal growth of the economy
and inflation increase taxes faster than expenditures because of the
progressive nature of the income tax. Furthermore, it is sometimes
claimed that expenditures are set in nominal terms and are not automatically
affected by inflation. These factors tend to make the FES become more
restrictive each year in the absence of any "discretionary" changes. Adjust-
ment for "rf.sce'l dr-ag ;" due to economic growth, and an inflation adjustment
entirely different from the one considered in this paper have therefore been
10 suggested.
These two adjustments are generally undesirable for the purpose
of evaluating fiscal policy. First, it is arguable that changes in the
FES ascribed to fiscal drag or inflation are not discretionary. Congress
is certainly aware of their effects on the budget and of the need to reduce
taxes or increase real spending periodically if it wishes to avoid unwanted
increases in the FES. And it is not reasonable to assume that expenditures
are unaffected by inflation since the majority are indexed to prices and
increase without Congressional action. For items not indexed, it is reason-
able to believe that Congress intends to legislate real expenditures, not
nominal ones.11
An even more important disadvantage of these suggested changes,
however, is that they exclude from the policy measure things that should
not be excluded from policy discussion. While there is wide agreement
that policy should not try to counterbalance automatic stabilizers, we
may often want to compensate for the effects of fiscal drag and inflation
since they may often be destabilizing. Furthermore, these effects are
not systematically related to the degree of resource utilization, as are
those of automatic stabilizers. A decrease in the FES deficit caused
by a tax increase has just as much restrictive effect as a decrease
caused by fiscal drag or inflation.18
Footnotes
1. Further adjustments in corporate profits accounting have been
suggested by John B. Shoven and Jeremy I. Bulow in "Inflation
Accounting and Nonfinancial Corporate Profits," Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, 1975, no. 3, pp. 557-98, and 1976, no. 1,
pp. 15-57.
2. Deflating by the CPl. the decline in 1967 dollars is from $294.7
billion at the end of 1950 to $303.1 billion at the end of 1977.
3. Nominal capital gains or losses representing changes in the market
value of the debt, especially long-term bonds, are not considered
here. These gains or losses are always reversed by the redemption
date. However, in spite of the fact that the average maturity of
the debt issues is about 2 1/2 years, the gains or losses may be
significant in some years.
4. Since all flows in the national income and product accounts are on
an accrued rather than a cash basis this would be a consistent
treatment.
5. Since a small part of the Government debt is offset by Agency holdings
of private liabilities, which are also affected by inflation, this
adjustment may slightly overstate the effect of inflation on the
Government's net debtor position.
6. Because of generally short maturities, most of the nominal interest
rates on the public debt reflect current inflation expectations well.
Some older bonds have relatively high or low coupon yields, reflecting
the differing economic conditions that existed when they were issued.
The changes in inflation expectations between the issue dates and19
now are reflected in the current market values of these bonds.
So, as a percentage of market value, interest payments are similar
to those on new issues. Like holders of more recent issues,
holders of older bonds can generally be expected to reinvest
enough to maintain their real capital investment as long as their
real demand for Government securities remains unchanged.
It should be clear that it is the effect of inflation on the
market value of Government debt, rather than the nominal value, that
matters to these holders. But the market value of the entire debt
is hard to measure and, because of the preponderance of short
maturities, market value of nominal value would generally be quite
close.
7. Of course, in order to maintain the same interest rate as would occur
with no inflation, the Fed would have to reinvest the inflation
premiums it receives on its own holdings of Government securities.
Such a policy could be considered essentially neutral toward the
existing rate of inflation, neither exacerbating nor fighting it.
8. For the purpose of assessing the expansiveness of fiscal policy,
the weaknesses of the FES are sometimes overstated. Further
discussion of this point appears in the appendix.
9. Because interest payments increase lenders' tax liabilities and
reduce those of borrowers, inflation premiums may exceed the antici-
pated rate of inflation. This need not concern us however. It is
investors' demands for real Government debt that determine how much
they invest. Any extra premiums to cover taxes presumably would not
be reinvested or spent on goods and services, but simply used to
pay taxes.20
10. See, in particular, Edward M. Gramlich, nMeasures of the Aggregate
Demand Impact of the Federal Budge't;" in Wilfred Lewis, Jr.• ed.,
Budget Concepts for Economic Analysis, Brookings Institution, Studies
of Government Finance (Washington, D.C., 1968), pp. 110-27.21
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